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FOREWORD 
The proliferation in recent decades of international courts and tribunals with 
various jurisdictions and structures, as well as of judicial institutions with 
international participation, inevitably begs the following questions: What is the 
nature of their authority? And what should be their role in the shaping of a 
coherent international legal order? As some of these courts and tribunals have 
recently reached the end of their mandates or are about to close their doors, it is 
time for an assessment of their performance. In this context, the Copenhagen 
session of the Brandeis Institute for International Judges (BIIJ), held in July 
2016, proved a timely and challenging event. Judges from different courts and 
tribunals, along with academics from the Danish research project on 
international courts (iCourts) of the local university, gathered to discuss the 
authority of the international judiciary in a very stimulating and beneficial 
partnership. 
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The debate, initially introduced by an article of the iCourts director, was 
passionate, rigorous, and comprehensive while at the same time varied, as 
suggested by the term “authority.” In referring in general to the “authority” of 
international courts and tribunals, the theme of the Institute was clearly not a 
univocal one. As reflected in any dictionary, the word “authority” has different 
meanings, and each of them may capture features of the status and activity of a 
judicial body—from merely formal and factual legal implications to the 
reliability and moral performance of an institution that must be authoritative so 
as to inspire trust and respect in society. The purpose was to capture all or as 
many as possible of these relevant features, and this report of the Institute 
abundantly shows how this goal was achieved. 
Where does the authority of international courts and tribunals lie? The 
capacity to carry out their mandate under their respective statutes, and the 
degree of compliance with their decisions, are certainly useful indicators, but 
they do not exhaust the question. The impact of their judicial activity on States 
and the communities of individuals within their jurisdictions, as well as the 
acceptance of their decisions, are even more significant indicators. Ultimately, 
the quality of their jurisprudence, and the degree of their public reliability as an 
independent expression of justice, appear to be decisive factors in assessing the 
authority of international courts. In this perspective, are international courts and 
tribunals under an obligation to discharge their function by contributing to the 
formation of a coherent international legal order? Fragmentation and differences 
of views are unavoidable, but inter-judicial dialogue can remove inconsistencies 
and contribute authoritatively to the evolution of international customary law as 
a common legal denominator in international relations, thus removing 
incoherence on basic legal principles. 
The debate remains open on most of the issues raised during the Institute, 
but the discussions were intense and rewarding. These discussions also 
frequently built upon conversations from previous sessions regarding ethical 
aspects of the international judicial function. 
I have personally had the opportunity to participate in each BIIJ since the 
program’s inception in 2002—as a participant, session leader, and member of 
the Program Committee—and thus have been witness to its progressive 
development. After 15 years, the initiative taken by the International Center for 
Ethics, Justice and Public Life of Brandeis University should be regarded as an 
invaluable and irreplaceable forum for addressing fundamental ethical as well as 
practical questions which, are central to the action and performance of the 
international judiciary. 
 
   Fausto Pocar 
   Appeals Judge and former President, 
   International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
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ABOUT THE INSTITUTE 
Judges serving on the benches of 12 international courts and tribunals met in 
Copenhagen from June 27 to 30, 2016 for the eleventh session of the Brandeis 
Institute for International Judges (BIIJ). This small and confidential event, unique 
in the world of international justice, was carried out as an institutional 
partnership between the International Center for Ethics, Justice and Public Life of 
Brandeis University, and iCourts, the Danish National Research Foundation’s 
Centre of Excellence for International Courts at the University of Copenhagen, 
Faculty of Law. 
The Institute’s theme, “The Authority of International Courts and Tribunals: 
Challenges and Prospects,” was inspired in part from research iCourts scholars 
are currently conducting. The aim of the institute was to explore the nature of the 
authority of international courts and tribunals, the various challenges this 
authority may face in different types of jurisdictions, and the ways in which 
judicial institutions might enhance their authority in the eyes of constituents, 
parties, and the broader public. 
Session topics included: the authority of international courts; definitions 
and dilemmas; challenges and strategies related to the authority of judicial 
institutions; the role of international judges in building a coherent international 
legal order; the internal aspects of the functioning of international courts; and 
evaluating the performance of international courts. Participants were also 
introduced to the iCourts research agenda by Director Mikael Rask Madsen and 
heard from two scholars about their findings. This was followed by a 
stimulating discussion between scholars and judges about how research on 
international courts and tribunals can be relevant to judicial practice. 
Brandeis Ethics Center Director Daniel Terris and Director of Programs in 
International Justice and Society Leigh Swigart also had the opportunity to 
present the Center’s Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral History Project and receive feedback 
about its future form. 
The Institute ended with a public roundtable on “The Role of International 
Courts in Combatting Terrorism and Ensuring Peace.” Judge David 
Baragwanath of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, University of Copenhagen 
Professor Jens Elo Rytter, and former United Nations Under-Secretary-General 
for Legal Affairs Hans Corell each offered insightful remarks on this topic, 
which current events have rendered increasingly critical to global well-being. 
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BIIJ 2016 Participants 
International Judges 
 
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
•Solomy Bossa (Uganda) 
• Fatsah Ouguergouz (Algeria/France), Program Committee member 
 
Caribbean Court of Justice 
• President Sir Dennis Byron (St. Kitts & Nevis), Program Committee member 
 
East African Court of Justice 
• Emmanuel Ugirashebuja (Rwanda) 
 
European Court of Human Rights 
• Vice-President András Sajó (Hungary) 
 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
• Oliver Beauvallet (France) 
 
International Criminal Court 
• President Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi (Argentina) 
• Christine Van den Wyngaert (Belgium), Program Committee member 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
• President Vagn Joensen (Denmark), Program Committee member 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
• Fausto Pocar (Italy) 
 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
• Tómas Heidar (Iceland) 
 
Residual Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals 
• President Theodor Meron (USA) 
 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
• David Baragwanath (New Zealand) 
 
World Trade Organization Appellate Body 
• Ujal Bhatia (India) 
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BIIJ Co-Directors 
• David Thór Björgvinsson—Professor, University of Copenhagen, Faculty of 
Law; former Judge of the European Court of Human Rights in respect of Iceland 
• Richard Goldstone—former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; retired Justice of the South 
African Constitutional Court 
 
Conveners 
• Henrik Stampe Lund—Administrator, iCourts 
• Mikael Rask Madsen—Professor and Director, iCourts 
• Leigh Swigart—Director of Programs in International Justice and Society, 
International Center for Ethics, Justice and Public Life, Brandeis University 
• Daniel Terris—Director, International Center for Ethics, Justice and Public 
Life, Brandeis University 
 
Rapporteurs 
• Kerstin Bree Carlson—Researcher, iCourts 
• Harry James Rose—LL.M. student, University of Copenhagen 
 
Interns 
• Chantal Sochaczevski—Brandeis University, class of 2017 
• Lee Wilson—Brandeis University, class of 2018 Invited Guests and Presenters 
• Hans Corell—former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs 
• Federico Fabbrini—Associate Professor and Researcher, iCourts 
• Andreas Føllesdal—Co-director, PluriCourts, University of Oslo 
• Urška Šadl—Associate Professor and Researcher, iCourts 
• Geir Ulfstein—Co-director, PluriCourts, University of Oslo 
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PLENARY DISCUSSIONS 
1.  The Authority of International Courts and Tribunals: Definitions and 
Dilemmas 
The opening session of BIIJ 2016, led by iCourts Director Mikael Rask 
Madsen, was designed to flesh out the concept of “authority” in relation to 
international courts and tribunals. This concept was articulated in a recent article 
by Madsen, Karen J. Alter, and Laurence R. Helfer entitled “How Context 
Shapes the Authority of International Courts.”1 The article provides the 
framework and general theory for a larger project of comparatively assessing the 
authority of a large sample of currently active international courts (ICs) in the 
world.2 
The main objective of the article is to explain wide variation in the activity 
and influence of the nearly two dozen ICs currently in existence. What factors 
lead some ICs to become active and prominent judicial bodies that cast a rule-of-
law shadow beyond the courtroom, while others remain moribund or legally and 
politically sidelined? The article provides both a novel conceptualization of 
authority tailored to ICs and an in-depth discussion of the many contextual 
factors that impact ICs’ authority. 
The article introduces a key distinction between de jure and de facto 
authority.3 The implication is that formally delegated authority is insufficient for 
an IC to be effective. The authors argue instead that for an IC to gain de facto 
authority, it requires: (1) recognition that there is an obligation to comply with an 
institution’s rulings; and (2) engagement in meaningful action that pushes toward 
giving full effect to those rulings. 
The authors also describe three levels of IC authority: 4 (i) “narrow 
authority,” which exists when only the parties to a particular dispute take 
meaningful steps toward compliance with a court’s ruling; (ii) “intermediate 
authority,” which is achieved when the ruling is respected also by potential future 
litigants as well as “compliance partners”—executive branch officials, 
administrative agency officials, and judges; and (iii) “extensive authority,” which 
exists when an international court’s audience expands beyond its compliance 
partners to encompass a broader range of actors, including civil society groups, 
bar associations, industries, and legal academics.5 ICs with extensive authority 
 
1. Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen, How Context Shapes the Authority of 
International Courts, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1–36 (2016).  
2. The other empirical studies are available as open source at: DUKE LAW: LAW & CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS, https://lcp.law.duke.edu/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
3. Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 1, at 1–36.  
4. Id.  
5. Id.  
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consistently shape law and politics for one or more legal issues within their 
jurisdictions. 
Interestingly, these levels of authority do not necessarily increase 
incrementally from narrow to extensive. In fact, an IC may well achieve 
extensive authority—that is, recognition and influence in wider legal circles and 
with the general public—without having achieved compliance by parties directly 
affected by its decisions or by government actors. 
Furthermore, the article makes a slightly controversial distinction between 
“legitimacy” and “authority.”6 The argument for sidelining questions of 
legitimacy is that it appears from empirical studies ICs can do everything 
normative theorists might expect of a legitimate international judicial body 
without authority in fact. In other words, why audiences recognize ICs and take 
consequential steps regarding their decisions is not assessed as a key factor for 
explaining ICs’ authority. 
Madsen asked BIIJ participants to think about how this model of authority 
fits their own institutions and the contexts in which they operate. What are the 
external factors shaping the authority of their institutions at the political, legal, 
and societal levels? What means are available to international judges inside and 
outside the courtroom to influence audiences and contexts? How can ICs build 
trust in key audiences, including domestic courts? What kinds of implementation 
and compliance challenges do judges’ institutions face? 
Judges had several reactions and queries regarding this model of authority. 
One institution not mentioned in the Madsen et al. article was the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).7 A participant explained that its 
authority might look weak given that it had just celebrated its 20th anniversary 
but only adjudicated 20 cases to date.8 But the reality is that States have 
alternatives to bringing a case concerning law of the sea matters before ITLOS, 
namely using the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or a special arbitration panel 
instead.9 It was suggested that the authority model should consider whether an 
institution has mandatory jurisdiction or not. It was also pointed out that the 
limited cases decided by ITLOS have seen an excellent compliance rate, and its 
jurisprudence has clarified much about the prompt release of vessels and the 
setting of bond. The participant concluded, “[t]he Tribunal is quite authoritative, 
so much so that states don’t need to bring [these kinds of] cases.” 
The Madsen et al. article did assess the authority of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Appellate Body, indicating that it has authority at all 
 
6. Id.  
7. The Tribunal, INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR L. SEA, https://www.itlos.org/the-tribunal/ (last visited Dec. 6, 
2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
8. Cases, INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR L. SEA, https://www.itlos.org/cases/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2017) (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
9. The Tribunal, supra note 7.  
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levels.10 A participant noted that when the Appellate Body rules, it always keeps 
its constituencies in mind as the rulings are binding on them. It is also important 
to think about the interests of business, the interface between trade and the 
environment, as well as views on the benefits of globalization and 
interdependence. There are many “questioning voices” about these issues and 
sometimes a breakdown in consensus. He conceded that “like it or not, outside 
opinions inform Appellate Body decisions.” 
A human rights judge suggested that to really understand the authority and 
impact of an IC, one must look at the relation of its rulings to state parties. If a 
judgment results in a definition of the continental shelf, for example, “no one is a 
loser in the long run.” And if the International Criminal Court (ICC) rules against 
Kenyan defendants, it is bad for the Kenyan government “but it doesn’t change 
the game for the community.” On the other hand, if a court like the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) takes a position on police powers, “it changes 
the game for all states and they may all feel like they are losers.” 
Another human rights judge questioned the distinction between de jure and 
de facto authority. “For me, legal authority, de jure authority, is linked to the 
authority of the judgment itself, a judgment of good quality. And de facto 
authority is its overall impact on society.” He furthermore suggested that it is 
important to see how a court contributes to “fertilizing the soil” in its jurisdiction 
so it can strengthen the rule of law. 
Judges from international criminal tribunals had the most questions about 
how the authority of their institutions might be assessed. Several asked about the 
role of their institutions’ formal sources of authority—the United Nations 
Charter’s Chapter VII11 for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), and to some extent the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (STL), and the Rome Treaty for the ICC, with special situation 
referral by the Security Council also based on Chapter VII. One judge noted, in 
relation to Serbia and the ICTY, that “just because something comes from 
Chapter VII doesn’t mean there is compliance.” Another judge remarked the 
STL’s authority appears “to turn on things beyond the Charter itself.” Basing the 
ICC on a multi-party treaty instead of a Security Council resolution, pointed out a 
participant, “was considered at the time a better democratic foundation for a 
court.” But the ICC’s foundation has also led to problems of de jure authority. 
“An institution which is global should be globally supported,” the judge 
continued, alluding to the fact that several states, including some very powerful 
 
10. Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 1.  
11. This chapter of the Charter addresses “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the 
Peace, and Acts of Aggression.” Chapter VII, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-
charter/chapter-vii/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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ones, have not ratified the Rome Treaty.12 “If an institution is perceived as weak, 
it cannot address the matters that people think are important.” 
The discussion then turned to the relationship among a criminal tribunal’s 
mandate, its actual accomplishments, and its perceived authority. ICTY 
objectives included not only prosecutions and trials, but also reconciliation and 
establishment of a narrative about the Balkans conflict.13 That region’s 
population may evaluate the ICTY’s authority not just on its jurisprudence, but 
also its success in the latter, non-legal areas. How authoritative can the ICTY be, 
asked a judge, when “each of the regions still has its own narrative where they 
see themselves as victims and don’t accept others as victims?” 
Another judge brought up the ICTR, noting that its “factual authority” is 
weaker than that of the ICTY, given the ICTR closed its doors with some 
indictees still at large.14 On the other hand, he continued, “the gold standard of 
the ICTR is Rwanda, a haven of stability, whereas wars continued in Bosnia and 
broke out in Kosovo after the creation of the ICTY.” Nonetheless, the authority 
model discussed in the session would assign more complete authority to the 
ICTY. A judge from another criminal court raised a fundamental issue: “When 
we discuss performance indicators [of ICs], it is important to ask about how to 
measure impact. And impact on what? And on whom?” 
Madsen replied that the framework on IC authority is not about performance 
in a narrow sense, that is, about whether courts are accomplishing what is 
outlined in their mandates. He also explained that their concept of authority does 
not depend on a formal source but rather, in a Weberian approach, on the impacts 
a court has on various levels of society. The model is a sociological construct that 
goes beyond performance-based assessment. Madsen conceded, however, that 
the model seems to have better explanatory power for courts dealing with 
regional and economic matters and human rights than for international criminal 
tribunals. 
BIIJ participants appreciated their discussion of this new model of authority 
in the international judicial sphere, as well as the new perspectives it offered on 
their own and colleagues’ institutions. Following this discussion of a more 
abstract theory of the authority of international courts, the next session gave the 
participants the opportunity to explore how challenges to authority play out in the 
daily operation of ICs. 
 
12.. The State Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/ 
pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited Dec. 6, 2017) (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
13. About the ICTY, U.N. INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
http://www.icty.org/en/about (last visited Nov. 16, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
14. Alastair Leithead, Rwanda Genocide: International Criminal Tribunal Closes, BBC (Dec. 14, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35070220 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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2. The Authority of International Courts and Tribunals: Challenges  
and Strategies 
The second session of BIIJ 2016 aimed to further the discussions around IC 
authority initiated in the first session. Session leaders Vagn Joensen, President of 
the ICTR during its final three years of operation, and Richard Goldstone, former 
ICTY Prosecutor and BIIJ Co-Director, delved into the authority challenges 
faced by international criminal courts and tribunals in particular, to set the stage 
for the sharing of experiences across other types of jurisdictions. The ultimate 
objective of this session was for the assembled judges to think about possible 
strategies for both overcoming challenges to authority and for enhancing 
authority. 
Joensen, who continues to serve as judge of the Residual Mechanism for 
International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) since the ICTR closed, presented some 
of the issues faced by international criminal institutions in relation to: (i) their de 
jure authority, in particular the challenge of persuading states to become state 
parties to the permanent criminal court(s) and the challenge of persuading state 
parties to these courts—as well as partner states to the hybrid courts—not to 
reverse their membership; (ii) their de facto authority, in particular when states 
do not comply with their obligations to cooperate on investigations, the arrest and 
transfer of suspects and/or by interfering with witnesses (whether the non-
compliance/interference aims at preventing influential suspects from being 
prosecuted, or at retaining suspects for—possibly more robust—domestic 
prosecution); and (iii) the authority of international courts at the domestic level, 
in particular the impact international courts have on the jurisprudence as well as 
the ability and willingness of domestic jurisdictions to prosecute international 
crimes in accordance with international standards. 
To illustrate some of these issues, Joensen described various difficulties the 
ICTR encountered over its lifetime. These included: the Rwandan government’s 
changing stance on cooperation with the Tribunal; problems with the arrest and 
transfer of indictees from other African countries; dealing with unforeseen legal 
problems, such as compensating for extended pre-trial detention of an ICTR 
indictee accused in a foreign country; and the inability of the Tribunal to 
investigate cases against Tutsis for political reasons.15 All of these issues 
necessitated a certain flexibility from the ICTR—a “principled” flexibility, 
Joensen stressed—if it was to carry out its important mandate. 
Goldstone then elaborated on a challenge to the authority of the ICC that 
came from his home country of South Africa. In 2015, the authorities failed to 
 
15. See generally KATE GIBSON, UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, 
RELIANCE UPON AND COMPLICATIONS WITH STATE COOPERATION, available at 
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/publications/compendium-documents/ii-reliance-complications-
state-cooperation-gibson.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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arrest Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir when he attended an African Union 
summit in Johannesburg.16 The ICC had issued two separate arrest warrants in 
2009 and 2010 for President Al Bashir, following a Security Council referral 
under Chapter VII, and as a State Party to the Rome Statute, South Africa had an 
obligation to cooperate with the Court.17 The South African government decided 
instead to honor Al Bashir’s head of state immunity, established under customary 
international law.18 The Rome Statute explicitly rejects, however, such 
immunity.19 Subsequently, the South African Litigation Centre brought a suit 
against the government on this matter to the High Court in Pretoria, which 
rejected the government’s position.20 Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, the government was again judged to be in violation—not of its Rome 
Treaty obligations but rather the South African legislation passed to carry out the 
Rome Treaty domestically in 2002.21 Goldstone wondered if this incident might 
suggest that international judges “should have in mind domestic law that is 
relevant to their courts when framing requests to governments.” 
After the session leaders’ introductory remarks, participants broke into 
smaller groups according to their institution’s subject matter jurisdiction—human 
rights, interstate dispute resolution, or criminal—to discuss how the experiences 
of the ICTR and ICC may or may not be instructive to the participants’ own 
everyday realities. If not, then what are their overriding concerns in relation to 
institutional authority? They were asked to ponder the following questions: (1) 
To what extent should international or regional courts bargain with states in order 
to obtain their cooperation?; (2) To what extent should principles be bent in order 
to obtain that cooperation?; and (3) How should the judges of those courts react 
to criticisms of bias and playing politics? Upon reassembling as a plenary, a 
spokesperson for each group summarized their respective conversations. 
Human rights judges framed their discussion around the discretionary 
powers of their respective benches to “interact” with states found in 
violation of their human rights obligations. The question was raised: can 
such interactions be considered as “negotiation”? A judge of the African 
 
16. South African Court Rules Failure to Detain Omar al-Bashir Was ‘Disgraceful’, GUARDIAN (Mar. 
15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/16/south-african-court-rules-failure-to-detain-omar-
al-bashir-was-disgraceful (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
17. Norimitsu Onishi, Bid by Omar al-Bashir of Sudan to Avoid Arrest Is Tested in South Africa, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 14, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/15/world/africa/bashir-sudan-international-criminal-
court-south-africa.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
18. Id.  
19. Rome Statute art. 27, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S 3. 
20. South African Court Rules Failure to Detain Omar al-Bashir Was ‘Disgraceful’, supra note 16.  
21. South African Government Loses Appeal over Failure to Arrest Bashir, REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2016), 
https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN0WH19U?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0 (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) described the situation 
of his institution: The Court is called to interact with different actors both 
upstream and downstream. The Court is not bargaining; it is calling for 
African Union states to be party to the treaty and to file declarations on 
allowing individual access to the Court. This is one interaction. The 
second interaction is on the budget, and that is done initially with the 
ambassadors, and then the ministers. Downstream there are rulings of the 
Court, declarations and measures, and judgments. 
Judges of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) compared such 
interactions to the principle of the “margin of appreciation” found in the 
European system.22 Said one ECtHR judge, “[f]rom a sociological perspective, 
yes, this is bargaining.” Another opined, “[t]he margin of appreciation has 
become unwieldy and large; it prevents principled decisions because the Court 
shies away from treading on state toes.” 
Judges of interstate dispute resolution courts focused their conversation on 
what their institutions can do to enhance their authority. The judges agreed there 
are limits on what courts can actually do beyond draft judgments and advisory 
opinions that “matter” and speak to the public. One participant was concerned his 
institution issued press releases so technical in their language that they are hard 
for the media, much less the average layperson, to interpret. He suggested that 
the communications department try to “simplify its language so that stakeholders 
can understand decisions of the court.” Other judges suggested outreach by their 
courts, including workshops and other specialized events, can do much to raise 
their profiles in a positive manner. Finally, participants stressed that ensuring 
“collegiality and confidentiality” on the bench, especially to protect the opinions 
of individual judges, contributes to bolstering institutional authority. 
Participants who serve on the benches of international criminal courts and 
tribunals discussed whether ad hoc and hybrid courts have more authority than the 
permanent ICC. They returned to a topic raised in the first session, that of the 
source of an institution’s authority and whether it plays a role in the institution’s 
level of authority. The judges collectively concluded, “[w]e need political support 
from states.” This led to two follow-up questions: “How much do our courts need 
to bargain to maximize this support? And who will do the bargaining?” The 
judges noted criminal courts and tribunals comprise not only Chambers but also 
Offices of the Prosecutor and Registries. Each of these organs may have a role in 
maximizing the support of states for their work. 
 
22. According to the Council of Europe, the parent body of the ECtHR, “The term ‘margin of 
appreciation’ refers to the space for manoeuvre that the Strasbourg organs are willing to grant national 
authorities, in fulfilling their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights.” The Margin of 
Appreciation, COUNCIL EUR., https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/themis/echr/paper2_en.asp 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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Session two ended with some general remarks arising from participants’ 
examination of IC authority. One criminal judge felt the assessment of authority 
should take into account the particular circumstances of an institution: “If you are 
working in a post-crisis country, you necessarily have less authority.” A judge 
from a human rights court noted his institution’s work is so multi-leveled—with 
persons, states and NGOs all bringing in their interests—that it is complex to 
evaluate. Another added that perceptions of human rights courts depend on which 
audience—political, societal, or legal—is assessing its work. A participant who 
was a long-time domestic judge before joining an international bench stated an 
obvious aim for all judges but one that always bears repeating: “It is vital to 
produce good quality judgments that are accessible to the community, clear and 
principled.” This may be the most effective and least controversial path to 
maximizing the authority of any court. 
3. The Role of International Judges in Building a Coherent International Legal 
Order 
The third session of BIIJ 2016 addressed an issue about which international 
judges often express concern: the fragmentation of international legal norms, a 
phenomenon that, among other consequences, might decrease the authority of 
international courts and tribunals. During this session, led by Judge Dennis Byron, 
President of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), and Fausto Pocar, Judge and 
past President of the ICTY, participants had the opportunity to examine some 
strategies international judges and their institutions can use to reinforce the 
coherence of the international legal order. 
The potential to fragment international legal norms to undermine this order 
has received much attention by scholars over the past decade. Eva Kassoti, for 
example, focuses on what she terms “substantive fragmentation,” defined as “the 
possibility of divergent interpretations by the plethora of international 
adjudicatory bodies interpreting and applying the same substantive law.”23 She 
argues substantive fragmentation “poses a threat to adjudicative coherence, 
namely the need for consistency in judicial reasoning,”24 and that “judicial 
dialogue, in the sense of active engagement with the jurisprudence of other 
courts, is an important factor in counteracting substantive fragmentation.”25 
Byron described to participants how his court has embraced this idea of 
active engagement through “cross-referencing” the jurisprudence of various 
international courts and tribunals, both those with similar subject matter 
 
23. Eva Kassoti, Fragmentation and Inter-Judicial Dialogue: The CJEU and the ICJ at the Interface, 8 
EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 21, 29 (2015). 
24. Id. at 48. 
25. Id.  
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jurisdictions and those whose jurisprudence derives from a different legal domain 
but proves relevant to the elements of a particular case. The CCJ has thus cited 
judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as well as those 
of regional human rights courts, namely the ECtHR and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR).26 
Byron then referred to an article by former International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
Judge Gilbert Guillaume, who delves further into the idea of shared legal thinking 
by examining the use of precedent by international judges and arbitrators.27 
International judicial institutions, in general, do not recognize the binding 
authority of legal precedent, even in relation to their own jurisprudence. Despite 
this position, taking account of previous decisions, to treat persons in comparable 
situations as comparable, lends an important predictability to the law. At the same 
time, referring to judgments previously made—if only persuasively—in a 
mechanical fashion may stifle the law’s development and its need to adapt to the 
evolving demands of society. Guillaume notes that an expansion in the number of 
international courts and tribunals “not only creates risks of contradictory decisions 
in specific cases, but also risks of contradictions of jurisprudence.”28 Guillaume 
concludes that “[t]he challenge is to navigate between two risks: that of 
jurisprudential incoherence and that of government by judges. Legal precedent in 
international dispute settlement is neither to be worshipped nor ignored.”29 
In his introductory remarks, Pocar reiterated that predictability is vital if the 
public is to have confidence in the application of international law. He suggested 
coherence can be pursued not only through reference to established 
jurisprudence—whether from one’s own or another court—but also through the 
joint development of international customary law. This endeavor is particularly 
important for the prosecution of international crimes (war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, genocide, and torture), which aims to protect values that should be 
shared by all mankind. He asked, “[h]ow far is derogation justified when dealing 
with crimes that offend the international community as a whole? Can we afford 
fragmentation?” He added, in his view, the most important contemporary challenge 
for international criminal law is “ensuring effective application of the principle to 
fight impunity.” 
Pocar noted in closing that while the procedures to protect fundamental values 
may vary, the values themselves should be part of a common legal framework. He 
had earlier summed up this view in a published article: “An inter-judicial and inter-
institutional dialogue ensures that despite apparent inconsistencies in the 
application of international criminal law, the proliferation of international 
 
26. See Trinidad Cement Ltd. v. Guyana, Judgment, [2009] CCJ 5 (OJ) (Aug. 20, 2009). 
27. See generally Gilbert Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators, 2 J. 
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 5 (2011).  
28. Id. at 18. 
29. Id. at 5. 
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jurisdictions will ensure integration and contribute to the evolution of international 
human rights and humanitarian law, and therefore contribute to international 
customary law.”30 
Both session leaders expressed their belief scholars have exaggerated the 
specter of fragmentation. International judges understand the need to inform 
themselves of relevant jurisprudence issued from other international courts; 
indeed, it goes with the job. But this aspect of their work has perhaps not been 
sufficiently articulated to the public, nor is it a given that perfect coherence may 
ever be achievable in the international legal system. 
Entering the discussion period, session leaders asked their fellow judges to 
think about the following questions: (1) Should international courts consider that 
it is part of their duties to contribute to the coherence of the international legal 
order? Or do the history and development of multiple courts suggest that 
achieving coherence may be a losing battle?; (2) What is the philosophy or policy 
of their own courts in this regard?; and (3) How far can an open dialogue go in 
improving the common legal framework of international courts and tribunals? 
What are its limitations? 
BIIJ participants had many thoughts and experiences to bring to the ensuing 
conversation. A criminal judge declared at the outset that, in his opinion, 
fragmentation was a real problem and it undermined institutional authority. Such 
incoherence in international criminal law was understandable “in the beginning,” 
but by now, he continued, there should be more coherence. Another criminal 
judge observed for there to be real coherence in the field, newer criminal courts 
and tribunals should follow the jurisprudence established by the pioneering ICTY 
and ICTR. However, the ICC has declined to do so in several areas, including in 
its rulings around the mode of liability termed “joint criminal enterprise.”31 
An inter-state dispute resolution judge suggested fragmentation should be 
considered a challenge rather than a problem. Inter-court dialogue was desirable, 
he stressed, where appropriate. For example, ITLOS and the ICJ held a useful 
dialogue on an issue that has engaged both institutions, the delimitation of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. Another judge described how the 
East African Court of Justice (EACJ) decided in a particular case that it had the 
right to interpret the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the primary 
legal instrument of the continent-wide ACtHPR.32 Although the possibility of 
 
30. Fausto Pocar, The International Proliferation of Criminal Jurisdictions Revisited: Uniting or 
Fragmenting International Law?, in COEXISTENCE, COOPERATION AND SOLIDARITY 1705, 1722 (Holger P. 
Hestermeyer et al. ed., 2012). 
31. Giulia Bigi, Joint Criminal Enterprise in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia and the Prosecution of Senior Political and Military Leaders: The Krajišnik Case, 14 
MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. L. 51, 82 (2010). 
32. Ally Possi, It’s Official: The East African Court of Justice Can Now Adjudicate Human Rights Cases, 
AFRICLAW (Feb. 1, 2016), https://africlaw.com/2016/02/01/its-official-the-east-african-court-of-justice-can-
now-adjudicate-human-rights-cases/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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contradicting interpretations of the Charter arose, he accepted that “sometimes 
incoherence cannot be avoided.” 
The judges also raised the issue of fragmentation within the same institution. 
Separate chambers or panels within a single court may apply law in different 
ways; consequently, one judge declared, “there also needs to be dialogue within 
an institution.” One participant described the Appellate Body’s practice as 
exemplary for its capacity to counter internal fragmentation: a panel of three 
members sitting on a particular case will have exhaustive discussions around the 
relevant law, after which they present, in what is called “an exchange of views,” 
their thinking to the other four Appellate Body members, who then play “devil’s 
advocates” in order to check the robustness of the panel’s views.33 Through this 
exercise, a well-reasoned and common decision is reached in the end. 
In response to the idea that the cross-referencing of jurisprudence across 
courts will decrease the chance of incoherence, one participant remained 
skeptical. Such cross-referencing, in his opinion, is totally “instrumentalized” 
because courts cite whatever jurisprudence serves their strategic interest. “This is 
troubling,” he continued, “because you cannot build legitimacy by being one-
sided. Either disregard that side—this is the poor man’s way—or give both sides. 
It is best to admit fragmentation and deal honorably with it.” 
As to international judges’ duty to contribute to the coherence of 
international law, participants also asked what this might mean. “A coherent 
system doesn’t mean all decisions go in the same direction,” said one judge. 
Another asked, in a more philosophical bent, “[s]hould civilization be 
condemned to apply the first expression of law?” He added, “[l]aw must be 
dynamic, but the reasoning process must be consistent. That doesn’t mean that 
everyone thinks the same way.” Another participant seemed to believe that 
seeking coherence at all was unrealistic: “We are in a developing field and there 
is no coordination mechanism. It’s a fragmented world and there is no way out of 
it!” 
All in all, the assembled judges concluded that some people overestimate the 
risks of fragmentation, and the perceived need to make international law more 
coherent may itself undermine the authority of their institutions by interfering 
with the judicial function. Pocar ended the session with this insight: “Different 
opinions don’t mean incoherence. When there is incoherence on legal principles, 
then you have a problem in the international system.” 
 
33. The Process—Stages in a Typical WTO Dispute Settlement Case, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www. 
wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s5p3_e.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2017) (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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4. Internal Aspects of the Functioning of International Courts and Tribunals 
BIIJ participants turned their attention in this session to the realities of day-
to-day work in their respective institutions. To lead this session, Fatsah 
Ouguergouz, Judge of the ACtHPR and former secretary of the ICJ Registry, 
joined forces with David Thór Björgvinsson, Professor of Law at the University 
of Copenhagen, Faculty of Law, former ECtHR Judge and BIIJ Co-Director. 
Their introductory remarks laid out the wide array of factors affecting how 
complex judicial bodies function and the implications of less than optimal 
practices. 
The internal aspects of the functioning of international courts and tribunals 
are undoubtedly critical to both their authority and their performance (addressed 
in the following section), whatever the type of jurisdiction—human rights, 
criminal, interstate dispute resolution, or trade. Indeed, their authority and 
performance may mostly be assessed based on the number and quality of the 
rulings of these judicial bodies, as well as on their capacity to reply within a 
reasonable time to the demands for justice by litigants or parties. These “outputs” 
depend, in turn, on various factors and parameters. 
Among these factors and parameters, courts categorize some factors and 
parameters as “exogenous,” that is, established by parent organizations; they are 
therefore outside the control of international judges. These include: the scope of a 
court’s or tribunal’s jurisdiction (contentious and advisory); financing and 
budgets; the number and choice of judges (nomination and election/appointment 
process); the full-time or part-time status of judges; the salaries and honoraria for 
judges; access by litigants (compulsory or optional); and the choice of official 
languages (one, two, or more). One might also mention the clarity and 
preciseness of the institutions’ constitutive acts—about material and personal 
jurisdiction, for example—as well as the content of instruments of ratification or 
accession, including reservations relating to access by litigants. 
Other factors and parameters may be categorized as being “endogenous” and 
therefore more or less under the control of international judges themselves. The 
long list may include, depending on the court or tribunal in question: 
• working methods (rules of procedure and internal judicial practice); 
• composition into chambers or sections; 
• the role of the president; 
• the relationship between judges and the registry (division of work, role 
of legal staff); 
• influence of registry members on judicial decision-making; 
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• number and length of ordinary sessions (for courts with part-time 
judges); 
• scope of activities (judicial, administrative, budgetary, promotional, or 
diplomatic); 
• speedy treatment of repetitive cases and pilot judgments; 
• measures to secure consistency in case law; 
• selection of cases for single judge procedure (where relevant); 
• choice of personal working language(s); 
• use of technology (case management system or remote access to case 
files by judges); 
• outreach and communication (with technologies such as Twitter, 
Facebook, Flickr, Vimeo, etc.); 
• legal aid programs or funds; 
• exchange of technical expertise and best practices with other courts and 
tribunals; training of judges and staff; 
• relationships with civil society stakeholders; and, last but not least, 
• dedication of judges to their work. 
Given the length and breadth of this list of endogenous factors, the session 
leaders suggested that participants focus on some that are essential for ensuring 
optimal institutional authority. They considered those to be: relationships among 
members of the bench; the role and structure of the registry, including its 
relations with judges; and relationships between courts and tribunals and their 
key stakeholders. Participants were exceptionally open in their remarks during 
the discussion period, especially regarding what does not work well within their 
institutions. The summary below scrupulously respects the confidentiality of 
participants and thus is more general than the conversation upon which it is 
based. 
Participants began by describing the level of collegiality and cooperation 
existing among members of their benches. The Appellate Body practice of 
institutionalized consultation with all members in the formulation of a single 
decision was once again presented as a model of collegiality. Several participants 
bemoaned the fact that some judges were clearly better than others in terms of both 
their knowledge and their willingness to pull their weight. “Individuals do count” 
was the general feeling of participants (see a later section of this report for more on 
 The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 49 
597 
this issue). The character of the judge who presides over a particular case is also 
important, particularly in a criminal case where he or she controls the conduct of 
proceedings. A “weak” judge may lead to a slow trial. As one participant noted, “a 
qualified judge is not always a quality judge.” Participants mentioned the need for 
reforms in the nomination and election processes of international judges. As one 
participant said, “[t]he quality of judges makes the difference between a court that 
is respected and deemed credible or not.” 
Several participants also raised the troubling “de-responsibilization” of 
judges in certain courts. This can be seen through the increasingly important role 
of legal assistants in the work of chambers, even in substantively shaping draft 
judgments, a task usually considered to be the primary responsibility of judges. 
Participants from criminal institutions defended a certain dependence on these 
staff members, explaining that legal assistants play the vital role of sifting 
through mounds of evidence and helping on the small procedural decisions that 
may render the workload of criminal judges extremely heavy. Several 
participants mentioned the important reality that legal staff are often long-time 
employees of a court or tribunal, and thus may carry the institutional memory and 
have a better familiarity with its practices than judges who necessarily come and 
go. Despite this important input of legal staff, a participant insisted, “[i]t is 
important for the credibility and authority of courts that judges bear 
responsibility for decisions. Staff members do not have accountability.” Another 
participant concurred: “If courts are inefficient, judges are responsible. If it 
doesn’t work, judges should change it!” 
Discussion then moved to the registries of international courts and tribunals 
and the central role they play in their functioning. As one very experienced 
international judge noted, “[t]he registry has a tremendous impact on the 
perception of a court.” Despite a general recognition of all that a registry does, 
participants expressed many and varied frustrations about their respective 
administrative branches. These included: the control exerted by registries in some 
courts over provision of legal assistants, so that they are not answerable to the 
judges they assist; the ability of the registry, in institutions where it assigns 
judges to cases, to purposefully deploy judges perceived as “conservative” or 
“radical” to influence judicial decision-making; a registry’s ability to impose 
shape on the development of case law in institutions where it produces draft 
judgments; the registry’s attempt to “second guess” a judge’s decision about an 
accused person’s need for legal aid, presumably for budgetary reasons; the need 
to thwart the “imperialist tendencies” of certain individual registrars; and more 
generally, the undue influence and power of registry staff who may be long-term 
employees of a court or tribunal. While participants did not offer any concrete 
strategies for resolving such conflicts between chambers and registries, they 
appreciated the opportunity to articulate their misgivings about various aspects of 
this relationship, one that is fundamental to the smooth functioning of any court 
or tribunal. 
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Finally, BIIJ participants turned to the question of how their institutions 
reach out to stakeholders. Many international courts and tribunals have 
dedicated units that take care of this important function. The most elaborate 
outreach program may be the ICC’s, with six “field offices” in situation 
countries and a liaison office in New York City. In this way, the Court 
attempts to have positive relationships with states, populations affected by 
crimes, and relevant NGOs. Judges from other jurisdictions weighed into the 
discussion, describing how their institutions attempt to communicate their 
work to various audiences, be it through press releases, publication of 
judgments and law reports, public speeches, or promotional activities in 
member states. There was some feeling that court presidents may be called 
upon to have a more public persona vis-à-vis stakeholders. One president in 
attendance wondered, however, what the limits of appropriate engagement 
with the public might be and if there was a point beyond which an institution’s 
authority might be compromised by exchanges with stakeholders. Participants 
also mentioned outreach activities designed to “drum up business,” which 
underutilized newer courts sometimes use. Such a strategy contrasts with that 
of a court like the ECtHR, which instead looks to slow down the flow of cases 
to decrease its backlog. 
The aspects of internal functioning addressed in this session, and their 
implications for how courts and tribunals carry out their mandates, led naturally 
into the following one that took on the complicated question of how to evaluate 
the performance of international courts and tribunals. 
5. Evaluating the Performance of International Courts and Tribunals 
The authority of international courts and tribunals had already been 
examined through a variety of lenses during BIIJ 2016, from using a somewhat 
abstract sociological model to considering what judges themselves can do to 
improve their everyday functioning as well as bolster the coherence of the legal 
system in which their institutions operate. Participants now turned to a critical 
question that is inevitably linked, in the minds of many, with how authoritative 
international courts and tribunals are perceived to be—how well do they 
perform? This session was co-led by Richard Goldstone and Christine Van den 
Wyngaert, Judge of the ICC and former Judge of the ICTY. They used a recent 
“performance self-evaluation” conducted by the ICC as a launching point. 
Van den Wyngaert began her introductory remarks by noting that assessing 
the performance of international courts and tribunals has become a topical issue 
in recent years. A crucial question at the outset of any such evaluation is how to 
define the concept of performance itself. Evaluating an international court’s 
performance cannot simply be a matter of calculating profit margins, as with 
private companies, or even conviction rates and workloads, as with national 
judicial systems. If it is “hard to put a price on justice,” then this applies a fortiori 
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to international justice, she declared. This is why courts have been trying to 
develop “performance indicators,” which will allow them to measure their 
performance. At the ICC, all the organs of the Court (judges, prosecutors, and 
members of the registry) recently engaged in a court-wide exercise to develop 
such indicators. Van den Wyngaert observed that this was a fascinating exercise, 
and one which proved more difficult than expected at the outset. They learned 
that it is indeed difficult to measure the work of a court. 
Participants noted there has been a lot of recent scholarly work on the 
performance of international courts and tribunals, and different models have been 
used to analyze their performance. The nature of these models, however, is such 
that only quantifiable aspects of the court’s work are capable of meaningful 
assessment. The most common models for analysis were then discussed and 
critiqued. 
a)  The compliance rate approach looks at the degree of compliance by 
parties with court orders made against them. By this token, the 
higher the compliance rate, the more successful the international 
court or tribunal. It is one of the few variables that is capable of 
being quantified. The problem with this model is that compliance 
may relate to extra-legal factors and may have nothing to do with the 
quality of the ruling. For criminal courts, a further problem is that 
they rely almost completely on the cooperation of states at all 
possible levels: execution of arrest warrants, evidence gathering, the 
conduct of investigations, and the enforcement of sentences. The 
ICC has faced non-compliance problems, notably in the failure by 
states to arrest and surrender President Al Bashir from Sudan, as 
discussed in Session two by Richard Goldstone. Reliance on 
signatory states for the functioning of the Court therefore attaches 
too high a price to cooperation and non-cooperation and may be too 
narrow a test for measuring the ICC’s performance. The compliance 
rates approach therefore does not seem to be suitable for all 
international courts. 
b)  The usage rates approach refers to the extent of the court’s 
workload. Applying this model to international courts may be very 
different from one court to another. For example, the ICJ was hardly 
used during the Cold War years. At the celebration of the 70th 
anniversary of the ICJ on April 20, 2016, many speakers praised the 
fact that, in recent years, the workload had considerably increased, 
which had made the court more relevant and important as the 
principal judicial organ of the UN. By comparison, the usage model 
as applied to the ICC begs the question: usage by whom? This is in 
view of the triggering mechanisms under the statute which can be 
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States, the Security Council, but also the Prosecutor acting proprio 
motu. At the ICC, which is based on the complementarity principle, 
less “usage” of the court may mean that complementarity is working 
and that investigations and prosecutions are effectively taking place 
on the national level. For the ICC, in an ideal world, it should have 
no work at all. Like the compliance model, the usage model does not 
seem to be an adequate model for measuring the performance of all 
international courts and tribunals. 
c)  The goal-based approach looks at whether and how a court 
effectively fulfils the mandate set out in its charter. This model was 
originally applied to private companies and NGOs to measure their 
effectiveness and is now proposed by one of the leading authors in 
the field, Yuval Shany, to measure the performance of international 
courts and tribunals.34 This model considers the fact that several 
goals may exist simultaneously. In doing so, it allows for a more 
nuanced assessment of the performance of an institution. 
Interestingly, and perhaps most problematically for international 
courts, is the fact that, in contrast to private companies or even 
national (criminal) justice systems, there may be disagreement about 
the court’s goals. 
Thus, before answering the question whether an international court or tribunal 
is attaining its goals, a preliminary normative question is what should these goals 
be? There are many problems with this. Some goals, particularly ultimate goals, 
may be vague and thus open to interpretation. What Shany defines as “goal 
ambiguity” may therefore leave too much room for irreconcilable views on the 
perceived goals of the court. The diverse number of stakeholders in any one 
international court or tribunal means that entirely dichotomous goals may exist 
with little chance of these being reconciled. Also, the precise time frame for the 
attainment of goals is especially difficult to gauge. Of particular importance to 
infant courts is the extent to which one can use the first years of a court’s 
existence to gauge levels of performance in the long term in light of inevitable 
“teething problems.” 
There can also be a divergence between performance measurement from an 
internal perspective (i.e. by actors and stakeholders from inside the institution) 
and performance measurement from an external perspective (i.e. by actors and 
stakeholders from outside the institution). The ICC suffers from such divergence. 
Its most important goals from the inside are ending impunity by increasing 
accountability of state officials for international crimes, deterrence or prevention 
 
34. See generally YUVAL SHANY, ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS (Ruth 
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of these crimes, ensuring international peace and security, enhancing 
international cooperation in the prosecution of international crimes, and 
guaranteeing lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice. 
However, the common goals projected on the ICC from the outside may be quite 
different, coming from states parties, accused persons, victims’ groups, and 
various NGOs. “It is important to consider the question of acceptance in situation 
countries,” Van den Wyngaert stressed. The fact that the work of the ICTY did 
not result in a shared narrative about the Balkan conflict in Serbia, Croatia, and 
Bosnia points, she believes, to a failing of the Tribunal. She contrasted this with 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which 
succeeded in establishing a common narrative about that country’s apartheid era. 
Van den Wyngaert then noted that the divergence between internal and 
external goals may be more extreme for the ICC and other criminal institutions 
than for other types of international and regional jurisdictions. However, she 
believes that it is important for all international courts and tribunals to consider 
the external perspective when they attempt to measure their own performance. 
She also applauded the iCourts’ model discussed in Session 1 for utilizing the 
external impact of ICs as one of the ways to determine their authority. 
Goldstone then opened the discussion period of the session with the 
following two questions: (1) Should judges be involved in assessing the 
performance of their respective institutions? If yes, how?; and (2) What are the 
performance indicators that are relevant for judges’ respective courts or 
tribunals? A lively and wide-ranging conversation ensued. 
Judges from criminal institutions identified with the tension between internal 
and external performance indicators experienced at the ICC. One participant 
observed that criminal tribunals operate in an extremely political environment, 
and some prosecutors take positions motivated by extraneous considerations, 
such as the victims’ interests or balance between ethnic groups. He recommended 
the exercise of caution: “If we play to constituencies, we lose the credibility that 
the international community is willing to accord us. The mandate of a judge must 
be to decide guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If we go beyond that, there is a 
problem.” He contrasted a criminal tribunal to the South African TRC, which 
could seek other outcomes as it was not a purely judicial entity. 
Participants pointed out that criminal tribunals are often evaluated by insiders 
and parent organizations on the expeditiousness and fairness of their proceedings. 
A participant declared that the ICTY trials represent the “gold standard” of 
fairness, even though proceedings were often protracted. Another observed that 
the participation of victims in ICC trials—a development lauded by external 
stakeholders—will inevitably slow down the proceedings. “That’s where I see a 
discrepancy between what an internal and external assessment might be,” he said. 
In other words, pleasing the victim “audience” may compromise the Court’s 
performance from the point of view of internal stakeholders. A judge with 
experience in a hybrid criminal institution expressed his view that judges should 
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organize proceedings for efficiency as they see fit and then assess their own 
performance against the standards they set. “As for how their work is assessed 
externally, that is up to scholars to do.” 
Judges in interstate dispute resolution institutions shared some of the views 
of criminal judges. In speaking of the Appellate Body experience, a participant 
presented several benchmarking goals: first of all, the “prompt and fair resolution 
of disputes,” but also “avoidance of disputes” that may arise from disagreements 
around what constitutes compliance with past rulings. Another external 
stakeholder issue is access to the Appellate Body by some member states. It 
might cost upwards of $1 million to have a case adjudicated, so there is now 
assistance for poorer countries to file disputes. 
A member of a regional court opined that “performance improves when there 
are standards.” Judges should then be intimately connected to assessment 
procedures and undertake reforms if specific milestones are not met. A colleague 
from another regional court agreed, adding that such assessment should remain 
confidential. “You don’t want a document appraising what you do, and then have 
the temptation to make it more appealing to the outside world.” If individual 
judges are found to be the source of inefficiencies, then this needs to be worked 
out internally. 
Responding to the assertion that speed of adjudication should be a primary 
indicator of success, an interstate dispute resolution judge noted that this criterion 
only goes so far. “Let’s not lose sight of the most important theme, which is the 
substantive quality of our judgments, the rational outcome of our cases.” He 
admitted that this benchmark is, however, hard to measure. Another participant 
pointed out that the way individual judges approach deliberation influences 
performance. He asked, “[d]o they keep an open mind till the end?” A judge 
countered that in criminal jurisdictions, “there is a clash of judicial philosophy—
civil law wants the truth, and common law just wants to know if the Prosecutor 
proved the case.” Participants also raised the need for courts to “express 
[judgments] in a language the [stakeholder] community can understand.. And 
once again, participants suggested that external parties be involved in the 
assessment of judges’ arguments. 
Human rights judges then brought in the perspective of their institutions, 
which are charged with establishing standards across wide and diverse regions. 
Sometimes their benches must consider what is “realistic” and whether their 
rulings can be enforced. Returning to the standard of the speedy resolution of 
cases, participants pointed out that the ECtHR seems to have sacrificed 
transparency for expeditiousness. Under pressure from the Council of Europe 
(COE) to decrease its case backlog, most cases are now resolved by a single 
judge who produces no opinion laying out a legal argument. This makes an 
assessment of the Court’s output by external actors more difficult. But in any 
case, a participant observed, the COE seems more interested in the number of 
cases won than in the legal rationale behind rulings. 
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Another human rights judge said of his younger institution, “Number and 
quality should not be the only yardsticks.” He observed that his court is involved 
in enhancing the rule of law across its broad jurisdiction. “Think of human rights 
and justice as two beautiful flowers, which cannot develop in poor soil. Our court 
is fertilizing the soil.” He urged his colleagues not to overlook how their 
institutions relate to civil society, national judiciaries, and national human rights 
commissions when assessing their performance. 
Over the course of this discussion on performance, participants also brought 
up several issues of recurring interest and concern to international judges, issues 
that have been addressed during past Brandeis Institutes. These included: 
whether there should be a general code of conduct for international judges; 
methods for removing a problematic judge from an international bench; how 
term limits and considerations of post-service employment may affect the 
independence and performance of judges; and the need to vet nominees for 
international judicial positions and de-politicize their election/appointment so 
that the most qualified individuals can join the international bench. 
Mikael Rask Madsen noted, as the session ended, that BIIJ participants had 
“come full circle” by linking the notion of how the external community views 
international courts with how judges themselves assess their work. Both are 
critical in understanding the authority of international courts and tribunals and 
the reception and ultimate impact of their rulings. 
CONTRIBUTIONS BY ICOURTS AND BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY TO THE STUDY OF 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
1. The iCourts Research Agenda and Presentation of Findings by Two 
Affiliated Researchers 
Mikael Rask Madsen opened this part of the institute with a general 
introduction to iCourts and its principal research areas. He explained that iCourts 
supports pioneering studies that systematically explore the new role of 
international courts in the global order. These studies aim to examine how 
international courts significantly change the law across substantive areas of 
international law, and how they transform the interface of law and politics both 
nationally and internationally. The Center is particularly interested in issues 
related to the authority of international courts. In this regard, it develops research 
around three key issues—the institutionalization, autonomization, and 
legitimization of international courts. The iCourts working paper series 
demonstrates the broad range of scholarship on international courts and tribunals 
that the institution has supported to date. 
As an example of the kinds of work that iCourts-affiliated scholars are doing, 
Madsen introduced recent projects by Urška Šadl and Federico Fabbrini, both 
Associate Professors of Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen. 
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The scholars then had the opportunity to speak in depth about their projects and 
take questions and comments from the assembled international judges. 
1.1 Research on the Court of Justice of the European Union 
Šadl presented on the topic “Do International Courts Make Law in Small 
Steps? The Case of the European Court of Justice.” She contended that one of the 
reasons for the success of the CJEU is its use of “principled incrementalism,” a 
step-by-step judicial decision-making that strives for a workable balance between 
societal and legal concerns. Šadl explained that principled incrementalism allows 
courts to consciously or unconsciously balance the demands of the individual 
case against the demands of the whole body of law, in particular legal coherence 
and consistency. This ultimately lets them preserve the authority to interpret legal 
norms in the long run.35 
In the case of international courts, such balancing is additionally constrained 
by the increased political pressure from various states with dissimilar legal 
systems, conflicting political interests, varying degrees of international 
commitment, and the absence of a central enforcement mechanism that makes 
international courts particularly vulnerable and dependent on cooperation by 
powerful political actors.36 Šadl argued that by constructing its legal doctrines in 
a series of small steps, the CJEU has avoided political conflict and significant 
push back from the legal community.37 
The main findings of her study demonstrate that the CJEU’s use of principled 
incrementalism can be seen through its own citation patterns.38 There is a 
significant delay—on average more than eleven years—between the handing 
down of an important decision and the moment when it starts to have significant 
effect on subsequent case law.39 This “gestation period” is even longer for cases 
that introduce new doctrines or principles, versus cases that further develop or 
entrench them.40 These findings suggest that the CJEU has been careful not to 
immediately apply its newly established principles, especially in cases with 
symbolic rather than practical importance.41 Further, qualitative examination 
shows that when the CJEU introduces or extends its doctrines, it often mitigates 
the effects of the judgment by decoupling the abstract rule or principle from its 
 
35. See generally Urška Šadl, The Role of Effet Utile in Preserving the Continuity and Authority of 
European Union Law: Evidence from the Citation Web of the Pre-accession Case Law of the Court of Justice of 
the EU, 8 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 18 (2015).  
36. Id. at 22. 
37. Id. at 20. 
38. Id. at 26. 
39. Id. at 33. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 42. 
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effects (remedy from the principle), or delaying its effects.42 On this basis, it can 
be argued that the CJEU develops its doctrines in a step-by-step fashion, as 
predicted by the theory of principled incrementalism.43 
Šadl’s analysis contributes to a lively debate on judicial authority and law-
making of international courts in Europe and beyond,44 an investigation that is 
relevant also because of the increasing normative, interpretative, and political 
authority of international courts.45 Importantly, it adds to the existing literature, 
first by demonstrating empirically how international courts make international 
law and, second, by providing a deeper insight into the long-term maintenance 
rather than establishment of (legitimate) supranational judicial authority.46 
1.2 Research on the European Human Rights System 
Federico Fabbrini discussed his recent monograph Fundamental Rights in 
Europe: Challenges and Transformations in Comparative Perspective.47 The 
book argues that, today, fundamental rights on the continent are simultaneously 
protected at the levels of States, the European Union, and the European 
Convention on Human Rights.48 The book aims to analyze the implications of 
this multilevel architecture and examine the dynamics that spring from the 
interaction between different human rights standards in Europe.49 
To this end, the book adopts a comparative approach: departing from 
prevailing literature in the field, the book explains that the European system is 
not exceptional and develops a comparison with the federal system of the United 
States of America.50 In a comparative perspective, the book identifies two 
recurrent challenges in the interplay between different state and transnational 
human rights standards—a challenge of ineffectiveness and a challenge of 
inconsistency.51 It explains that these challenges arise when transnational law 
 
42. Id. at 29. 
43. Id. at 20. 
44. See generally INGO VENZKE, HOW INTERPRETATION MAKES INTERNATIONAL LAW: ON SEMANTIC 
CHANGE AND NORMATIVE TWISTS (2012); MARC JACOB, PRECEDENTS AND CASE-BASED REASONING IN THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: UNFINISHED BUSINESS (2014); Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, In Whose 
Name? An Investigation of International Courts’ Public Authority and Its Democratic Justification, 23 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 7 (2012).  
45. See generally KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, 
RIGHTS (2014). 
46 Šadl, supra note 35, at 21.  
47. See generally FEDERICO FABBRINI, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE: CHALLENGES AND 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca eds., 2014). 
48. Id. at 1. 
49. Id.  
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 2. 
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operates either as a floor or as a ceiling of protection for a specific human right.52 
In addition, the book maps the most important transformations taking place 
in the European system and assesses their impact on these challenges.53 In an 
empirical part, the book considers four case studies: (1) the right to due process 
for suspected terrorists; (2) the right to vote for non-citizens; (3) the right to 
strike; and (4) the right to abortion.54 On the basis of these case studies, the book 
reconsiders the main scholarly theories on the protection of fundamental rights in 
Europe: sovereigntism and pluralism.55 It questions their validity and claims that 
the European system needs to take steps toward a new theoretical framework, 
which—for its capacity to reconcile the dilemmas of identity, equality and 
supremacy—will partake of a “neo-federal” vision.56 
1.3 What are potential benefits of academic research for members of the 
international judiciary? 
This session aimed not only to expose international judges to recent and 
ongoing scholarship on international courts and law but also to create a dialogue 
between scholars and practitioners. International judges were asked what kinds of 
academic research they, as practicing judges, find most relevant or instructive for 
their work. 
First, several judges responded to various points made by Šadl and Fabbrini. 
A criminal judge wondered how to define what constitutes a “leading case” 
whose influence can subsequently be tracked. He suggested that the ICTY Tadić 
judgment could be put in this category, as it was later “quoted everywhere.” 
Another judge queried Šadl about how the CJEU’s decisions may or may not be 
in sync with those of the ECtHR, given their overlapping regional jurisdictions 
but different legal foundations. She asked, “How do you not conflict and also 
develop law incrementally, without stepping on toes?” Šadl responded that courts 
do sometimes step on toes, so they need “to cite each other politely and 
respectfully.” 
In reference to Fabbrini’s presentation, several judges asked for clarification 
on his notions of transnational law acting as either a “floor” or “ceiling” for 
human rights protections. Can an international court actually impose a ceiling and 
require a state to lower its existing protections to meet that standard? If so, how is 
this reconciled with the European Convention on Human Rights? A human rights 





55. Id. at 14. 
56. Id. at 3. 
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Fabbrini responded that the Court is “creatively interpreting Article 1157 to bring 
social rights back in and expand them.” A second human rights judge commented 
that he sometimes felt like the ECtHR “opted for the lowest level” of protection. 
He gave as an example the court’s refusal to raise the standard on the right to 
abortion, given strict legislation on this issue in certain member states. A third 
human rights judge pointed out, “the low protection of one thing allows the high 
protection of another,” and that “conventions are tools of priorities.” Finally, a 
judge countered the ECtHR is, after all, “antidemocratic” in the way it requires 
certain standards across the Council of Europe despite the existence of local 
opposition. He opined that it is sometimes appropriate that “courts not become too 
authoritative.” 
The discussion then moved on to the place of scholarly publications in the 
work of international judges. A judge, and former professor, observed, “the 
impact of academia on international judges is less than I expected before 
becoming one.” Another judge noted that in his court, scholarly articles are 
seldom cited because judges “don’t want to privilege Professor X against 
Professor Z.” Thus, their legal writing becomes very “self-referential.” A 
criminal judge added that “judges in international criminal law don’t feel 
comfortable citing academics as authorities; they are much more comfortable 
citing other courts.” Another criminal judge expressed some frustration that 
academics are not interested in judges’ evaluations of their own work—“the 
attitude of some academics is that we should shut up and let them assess our 
accomplishments.” “There is danger in academics trying to influence process,” 
added a participant. 
Notwithstanding recognized restraints around the citation of scholarly 
publications, several participants emphasized the important role academic 
research plays in their work. One declared, “[t]he reality is that academics are not 
far from the judiciary. Rather, judges, bar associations, and the academy are all 
part of the legal firmament.” He went on to make a plea for academics to see 
themselves as “part of the exercise.” Judges also recognized the important role of 
expert knowledge in legal proceedings that involve certain scientific matters, 
intellectual property, or other specialized fields. Some participants believed 
having libraries in courts is essential, although sometimes administrators seek to 
eliminate them because they consider them unnecessary. 
iCourts’ scholars then weighed in on this subject. Madsen noted that iCourts’ 
research shows the foundation between academics and practitioners is “strong 
and patterned.” He also emphasized that ongoing connections between the two 
groups can keep judicial outputs from becoming, as one judge had earlier phrased 
 
57. Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the freedom of assembly and 
association. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 11, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 2889, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
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it, “self-referential.” Fabbrini suggested, “academics can develop a common 
language of ideas and facilitate communication,” which creates paradigms that 
allow judges to perform better. Šadl observed judges and scholars seem to 
sometimes struggle over who has ultimate authority on the law: “Both judges and 
academics engage. Judges contribute by issuing well written opinions, and then 
academics do the empirical analysis.” 
A final question arose during this session that engendered some lively 
responses. Given the nature of much research on judicial opinions and systems, is 
there an assumption that “international judges are essentially interchangeable 
parts”? In other words, does it matter which individual judges sit on particular 
courts? One president declared, “[w]e want to matter. And, perhaps unfortunately, 
individual judges do matter.” This participant noted the frequent circulation of 
judges on and off the bench, and suggested that the institution needed to “develop a 
homogeneous judicial culture” that would unite judges from different countries and 
backgrounds. Another participant concurred, saying an individual judge’s role in 
developing law is critical, especially in international criminal institutions. This can 
be clearly seen in the development of law around rape and genocide, for example. 
He added, “But judges hesitate to speak about this law-making function, and we 
cannot discuss it in any public forum.”  
2. The Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral History Project 
Leigh Swigart and Daniel Terris of Brandeis University then had the 
opportunity to introduce BIIJ participants to the Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral History 
Project, initiated in Fall 2014 by the International Center for Ethics, Justice and 
Public Life.58 The Project “seeks to capture the memories, perspectives[,] and 
reflections of the individuals who participated in and observed the rapid 
institution building that occurred during the early years of the ICTY and ICTR.” 
The Project chose an oral history approach to document the Ad Hoc 
Tribunal’s development for its potential to contribute perspectives and 
understandings that have not emerged either through legal scholarship about the 
Tribunals or their own extensive jurisprudence.59 Oral history interviews preserve 
the voices of individual actors who worked to bring justice to Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia, and who contributed to the development and 
“institutionalization” of international criminal law during the early years of the 
ICTY and ICTR.60 The Project also seeks insight into what the Ad Hoc Tribunals 
 
58. See generally Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral History Project, BRANDEIS U., http://www.brandeis. 
edu/ethics/internationaljustice/oral-history/index.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review). 
59. See generally id.  
60. Id.  
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have and have not been able to achieve.61 The Project aims to produce an 
archived collection that will allow honest analysis, now and into the future, of the 
challenges and successes of the Tribunals.62 
As of the BIIJ’s 2016 report (April 2017), “the Project had interviewed 30 
judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, administrators, and other staff connected to 
the ICTY and ICTR, as well as commentators on international criminal law.”63 
The Project website provides profile pages for each interviewee, downloadable 
individual transcripts, and a link to the Brandeis Institutional Repository64 where 
a search across the entire collection can be made. Full transcripts of these 
interviews will be available by summer 2017.65 Several video clips are also 
available on the website.66 These video clips are based on selected excerpts from 
the interviews and have been produced to provide a “window” into the kinds of 
perspectives and memories that can be retrieved through an oral history 
approach.67 
Brandeis believes documenting the early years of the Ad Hoc Tribunals is 
important for several reasons: 
• The creation of the ICTY and ICTR represents a critical 
development in the roles and responsibilities of the international 
community in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, a development 
that informs global action today and underscores the need to 
establish the rule of law and human rights protections everywhere.68 
•  Individuals and institutions—from advocates and scholars to the ICC 
and other contemporary or future international criminal tribunals—
"can learn important lessons from an archive documenting the 
innovative work that started at the ICTY and ICTR and is now given 
fuller expression through “successor” institutions.”69 
 
 
61. See generally id.  
62. Id.  
63. Id.  
64. See generally BRANDEIS INSTITUTIONAL REPOSITORY, https://bir.brandeis.edu/handle/10192/30830 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
65 See generally Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral History Project- Interview Collection, BRANDEIS U., 
https://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/internationaljustice/oral-history/interviews/index.html (last visited Nov. 15, 
2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
66 See generally Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral History Project- Video Clips, BRANDEIS U., 
https://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/internationaljustice/oral-history/video-clips.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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• As a primary resource, this growing collection of oral history 
transcripts can be used in a variety of ways to inform the public 
about the Ad Hoc Tribunals and international criminal justice more 
generally. Students, scholars, and educators can use the materials in 
their research and analysis, in written histories of international 
criminal tribunals, and in studies across disciplines such as human 
rights, criminal law, sociology, history, and international relations.70 
•  The collection will be particularly powerful when used for 
educational purposes in post-conflict societies. The interviews 
convey, in an evocative manner, the dedication, commitment, hard 
work, and innovation of individuals who believe in the international 
criminal justice’s capacity to bring about accountability and 
reconciliation in societies affected by mass violence and human 
rights violations.71 
Further, Brandeis contends that exploring international courts and tribunals 
through the subjective views and specific experiences of individual actors can act 
as a complement to more analytical and objective approaches to these institutions 
and their work. Such an approach is not uncommon to social scientists working 
on issues of the law.72 But the unscripted and narrator-driven oral history 
interview has, in particular, the potential to bring forth unexpected and powerful 
stories about judicial institutions, including those pertaining to how they function 
internally, how they are perceived from the exterior, and ways in which they are 
understood to exert authority.73 
This latter point was perhaps most germane to BIIJ 2016’s “authority theme.” 
One question inspired by the Project is whether new kinds of narratives about 
international courts and tribunals can bolster their legitimacy and/or authority by 
showing constituents how they operate, especially at levels that are not normally 
visible to the outsider. As noted by Alter et al., “Constituency support is a key 
determinant of IC authority.”74 
Session leaders asked judges to ponder these questions: (1) What can an 
investigation of the stories of individual actors—especially those who are “under 
the radar”—contribute to relevant constituencies’ understanding and appreciation 
of international courts and tribunals?; (2) What are the benefits and risks of 
 
70. See id. 
71. See generally id. 
72. See, e.g., RICHARD ASHBY WILSON, WRITING HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS 
(2011); Salvatore Caserta & Mikael Rask Madsen, Between Community Law and Common Law: the Rise of the 
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giving voice to new perspectives on international courts and tribunals, not all of 
which may be positive? Might the authority of international courts and tribunals 
be undermined instead of reinforced by such “unfiltered” narratives?; and (3) 
Does the “official narrative” about participants’ courts and tribunals—controlled 
by the institutions themselves, or as presented through their jurisprudential output 
or by legal scholars—leave out something the public should know in order to 
believe in their legitimacy and authority? 
International judges had a number of reactions to the Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral 
History Project after having read several excerpts, viewed selected video clips, 
and listened to a presentation of its aims and methods. Many expressed the view 
that it was valuable in principle. One judge noted that such an archive “will be 
useful in history writing and as guidance to future participants in new courts.” 
Another commended the project, saying it was “important for posterity to see the 
lessons learned and the people involved in the Ad Hocs.” 
At the same time, some of the criminal judges in attendance expressed 
concern about the possible impact of “problematic” narratives on the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals’ legacy. They reacted, in particular, to the excerpt of an interview with 
an ICTR defense counsel who felt the Tribunal had not supported defense work 
as fully as that of prosecutors. It was suggested that, moving forward, the Project 
seek to balance viewpoints across the collection by carefully selecting 
interviewees. The importance of having a wide representation of nationalities and 
backgrounds among interviewees was stressed as well. Several participants also 
wondered if a series of questions could be formalized so a standard number of 
areas could be covered during interviews. 
Swigart and Terris took note of these points, and explained they hoped to see 
the Project move into a second phase, where they could consider these 
suggestions. They reiterated to the group, however, that conducting an oral 
history interview is different than a study where researchers explore pre-
determined areas of inquiry and strive for consistency when they engage with 
research subjects. While interviewers for the Ad Hoc Tribunals project prepared 
a number of questions in advance for narrators—based upon those narrators’ 
professional positions and biographies—they also allowed narrators to 
foreground the aspects of their experience that were personally significant and 
salient. The resultant oral history collection thus comprises a disparate range of 
subjects and viewpoints around its principal theme, some of which will inevitably 
be at odds with the “official narrative” of the Tribunals as presented through their 
jurisprudence, outreach initiatives, and the messaging of MICT—the Tribunals’ 
residual mechanism institution. Brandeis believes this richness and complexity is 
an important part of the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ “story,” and that the collection will 
constitute a valuable primary resource for researchers whose future areas of 
inquiry cannot be foreseen.  
  





David Baragwanath (New Zealand) is an Appellate Judge of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, where he served as President for three and one-half years. 
He practiced in New Zealand as Queen’s Counsel and was a judge of the High 
Court. He later became a permanent member of the Court of Appeal.75 He was 
President of the New Zealand Law Commission, presiding judge of the Court of 
Appeal of Samoa, and a New Zealand Member of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration.76 He is a graduate of the Universities of Auckland and Oxford, an 
Honorary Professor of the University of Waikato, and an Overseas Bencher of 
the Inner Temple.77 He has had visiting appointments at universities in England, 
the USA, Hong Kong, and the Netherlands.78 He has adjudicated, lectured, and 
written extensively on subjects including private and public international law 
(including international criminal law and terrorism), administrative law, 
commercial law (he is a member of the Advisory Board of the Dutch charity 
P.R.I.M.E. Finance, concerned with dispute resolution in complex financing 
transactions), judicial cooperation, and other aspects of the common law.79 
Olivier Beauvallet (France) assumed his duties as a Judge in the Pre-Trial 
Chamber at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia in April 
2015, after serving as Reserve Co-Investigative Judge.80 He was previously a 
prosecutor within the EU Special Investigative Task Force and a prosecutor 
within the special prosecution office of the EULEX mission in Kosovo.81 There, 
he was in charge of various cases related to organized crime, war crimes, and 
terrorism.82 Previously an investigative judge in France, he recently served in a 
special court for organized crime based in the French West Indies (special court 
for organized crime in Fort-de-France).83 He has participated in “various 
international projects in the Balkans, Africa, and Central Asia.”84 Following his 
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Ph.D. in law (EHESS Paris), Judge Beauvallet has authored various books and 
articles on both criminal and international criminal law, and he oversaw the 
Traité Pratique de l’Instruction—a guide to the practice of investigative 
judges.“85 He leads various trainings and seminars in l’École Nationale de la 
Magistrature (National Judiciary School), l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences 
Sociales (Paris), and many other law schools.”86 
Ujal Singh Bhatia (India) has been a member of the World Trade 
Organization since December 2011.87 He was elected Chair of the Appellate 
Body and assumed this position in January 2017.88 He was India’s Ambassador 
and Permanent Representative to the WTO from 2004 to 2010, and represented 
India in a number of dispute settlement cases.89 He also served as a WTO dispute 
settlement panelist from 2007-2008.90 Mr. Bhatia has also served as Joint 
Secretary in the Indian Ministry of Commerce, apart from two decades at Orissa 
State in various fields and state-level administrative assignments that involved 
development administration and policy-making.91 His legal and adjudicatory 
experience spans over three decades and focuses on domestic and international 
legal/jurisprudence issues, negotiation of trade agreements and policy issues at 
the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels, as well as the implementation of 
trade and development policies in the agriculture, manufacturing, and service 
industries.92 Mr. Bhatia has often lectured on international trade issues and has 
published numerous papers and articles on a wide range of trade and economic 
topics. “93 He holds an M.A. in Economics from the University of Manchester 
and from Delhi University, as well as a B.A. (Hons) in Economics, also from 
Delhi University.”94 
Solomy Bossa (Uganda) has 18 years’ experience as a judge with exposure 
in international judicial practice, international human rights, international 
criminal law, international humanitarian law, and constitutional law at the 
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national, regional, and international levels.95 She has served as Judge of the High 
Court of Uganda, the East African Court of Justice, and the United Nations 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.96 She is currently a judge of the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the United Nations Mechanism for 
International Criminal Tribunals, and the Court of Appeal of Uganda.97 Judge 
Bossa has advanced the status of women, the rights of victims of simple and 
grave international crimes, and human rights abuses.98 She has published papers 
and made presentations on varied legal issues.99 As a human rights activist since 
1980, she has founded/chaired many non-profit organizations, including the East 
African Law Society; Kituo cha Katiba, the Uganda Network on HIV/AIDS, 
Ethics, and the Law; and the National Organization for Civic Education and 
Election Monitoring.100 She has also presided over the Uganda Law Society, and 
the Legal Aid Projects of the Uganda Law Society and the Law Development 
Centre.101 She has received national, regional, and international awards in 
recognition of her distinguished services as a Bar leader, judge, and human rights 
activist.102 
Sir Charles Michael Dennis Byron (St. Kitts & Nevis) was appointed 
President of the Caribbean Court of Justice in September 2011.103 He graduated 
from Cambridge University in 1966 with an M.A. and L.L.B., after which he was 
in private practice throughout the Leeward Islands.104 In 1982, he was appointed 
as a Judge of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, and in 1999 was appointed 
Chief Justice.105 During his tenure, he engaged in many Judicial Reform 
Programs.106 In 2004, Sir Dennis was appointed a Judge of the United Nations 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).107 He was elected President 
of the Tribunal in 2007, and served in this capacity until 2011.108 Sir Dennis has 
been President of the Commonwealth Judicial Education Institute (CJEI) since 
 
95. Justice Solomy Balungi Bossa - Uganda, AFR. CT. ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, http://en.african-
court.org/index.php/2-uncategorised/38-justice-solomy-balungi-bossa-uganda (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
96. Id.  
97. Id.  
98. Id.  
99. Id.  
100. Id.  
101. Id.  
102. Id.  
103. Hon. Sir Charles Michael Dennis Byron, EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUP. CT., https://www.eccourts.org/ 
brief-history-of-the-court/hon-sir-charles-michael-dennis-byron/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
104. Id.  
105. Id.  
106. Id.  
107. Id.  
108. Id.  
 The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 49 
615 
2000.109 In 2004, he was appointed an Honorary Bencher of the Honourable 
Society of the Inner Temple and holds the first Yogis & Keddy Chair in Human 
Rights Law at Dalhousie University.110 He was knighted in 2000 and was 
appointed a member of the Privy Council in 2004.111 
Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi (Argentina) has been Judge of the 
International Criminal Court since 2010 and President since 2015.112 She has 
over 20 years of practice in international and humanitarian law and human 
rights.113 Coming to the Court from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where she 
was the Director General for Human Rights, Judge Fernández de Gurmendi 
acted as a representative of Argentina in cases before the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights.114 She has also represented Argentina before universal and regional 
human rights bodies and advised on transitional justice issues related to the 
prevention of genocide and other international crimes.115 Judge Fernández de 
Gurmendi contributed to the creation and set-up of the ICC.116 She was also 
instrumental in the negotiations of the complementary instruments of the Rome 
Statute as chair of the Working Group on Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as 
well as the Working Group on Aggression.117 Her academic experience includes 
professorships of international criminal law at the Universities of Buenos Aires 
and Palermo, and as an assistant professor of international law at the University 
of Buenos Aires.118 Judge Fernández de Gurmendi has also published a number 
of national and international publications related to the ICC including, amongst 
others, the role of the Prosecutor, criminal procedure, and the definitions of 
victims.119 
Tómas Heidar (Iceland) became a Judge of the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea on October 1, 2014. Previously, Judge Heidar served as 
Legal Adviser of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iceland for almost twenty 
years.120 As such, he was responsible for all matters of public international 
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law.121 He represented Iceland regularly at meetings on oceans and the law of 
the sea at the United Nations in New York and other international fora.122 He 
was also in charge of a number of negotiations with neighboring countries on 
maritime delimitation and fisheries.123 He was also Chairman of the National 
Commission on Continental Shelf Limits, was in charge of preparing the 
Submission of Iceland to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf, and was Head of Delegation at meetings with the Commission.124 Judge 
Heidar is the Director of the Law of the Sea Institute of Iceland and Co-director 
and lecturer of the Rhodes Academy of Oceans Law and Policy, which holds a 
prominent summer course each year in Rhodes, Greece.125 He is also a guest 
lecturer on the Law of the Sea at the University of Iceland and many other 
universities.126 Judge Heidar is author and editor of several books and articles on 
ocean affairs and the law of the sea, and a lecturer in numerous academic 
conferences and seminars in this field.127 He was awarded the title of 
Ambassador on September 1, 2014.128 
Vagn Joensen (Denmark) is currently a Judge at the United Nations 
Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals and one of three Duty Judges at 
its Arusha Branch.129 Judge Joensen also served as President and presiding judge 
of the Trial Chamber of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR).130 Judge Joensen was first elected as ICTR President at a special 
election held in February 2012 to fill the seat of the departing President upon her 
assignment to the Appeals Chamber.131 Judge Joensen was re-elected to a second 
term as ICTR President in April 2013 and he served as ICTR President until its 
closure on December 31, 2015.132 He originally joined the Tribunal in May 2007 
as ad litem judge and member of Trial Chamber III.133 Before joining the 
Tribunal, Judge Joensen was a judge at the Danish High Court, Eastern Division, 
in Copenhagen for more than a decade and served as an international judge at the 
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United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) from 2001 to 2002.134 He obtained 
a Master of Law in 1973 from the University of Aarhus and studied at the City of 
London College and Harvard Law School.135 Judge Joensen served in the Danish 
Ministry of Justice until he was appointed a judge at the City Court of 
Copenhagen in 1982.136 He has taught constitutional, criminal, and civil law at 
the Law Faculty of the University of Aarhus and at the University of 
Copenhagen.137 
Theodor Meron (USA) has been a judge of the Appeals Chambers of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) since his election to the 
ICTY in March 2001.138 He has served a total of four terms as President of the 
ICTY and recently started on his second term as President of the MICT.139 As a 
leading scholar of international humanitarian law, human rights, and international 
criminal law, President Meron has authored a dozen books on international law 
and chivalry in Shakespeare and more than a hundred articles, including some of 
the books and articles that helped build the legal foundations for international 
criminal tribunals.140 He is a member of the Institute of International Law and the 
Council on Foreign Relations; a fellow of the American Academy of Arts; and 
recipient of numerous awards, honors, and medals, such as the Hudson Medal 
(ASIL) and Haskins Prize (ACLS), as well as Officer of the French Legion of 
Honour and Grand Officier of the National Order of Merit.141 He is also past 
honorary President of the American Society of International Law and past Editor-
in-Chief of the American Journal of International Law.142 He is Charles L. 
Denison Professor of Law Emeritus at NYU Law School and since 2014, a 
visiting professor of International Criminal Law at Oxford.143 
Fatsah Ouguergouz (Algeria/France) is judge and former Vice-President 
of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights in Arusha, Tanzania.144 He 
was United Nations Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in 
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Burundi and has occupied various other positions within the United Nations 
System, including the International Court of Justice (The Hague) and the Office 
of Legal Affairs (New York).145 He holds a Ph.D. in International Law from the 
Graduate Institute of International Law of Geneva, and has taught Public 
International Law at the University of Geneva.146 He is a former Orville H. Schell 
Fellow (Yale Law School, New Haven CT, USA), former visiting professor at 
the University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II), and Father Robert F. Drinan Professor 
of Human Rights at Georgetown University Law Center (Washington D.C.).147 
Judge Ouguergouz is a Founding Member of the African Foundation for 
International Law (The Hague) and the African Institute of International Law 
(Arusha).148 He is a notable member of the International Commission of Jurists 
(Geneva) and the Governing Board of the International Institute of Human Rights 
(Strasbourg).149 He has published many articles and books and is Associate 
Editor of the African Yearbook of International Law.150 
Fausto Pocar (Italy) was President of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia from November 2005 until November 2008.151 He has 
served on the Tribunal since February 2000. Since his appointment, he has served 
first as a judge in a Trial Chamber and later in the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY 
and ICTR, where he is still sitting.152 Judge Pocar has long-standing experience 
in United Nations activities, in particular in the field of human rights and 
international humanitarian law.153 He has served as a member and President of 
the Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR and was appointed Special 
Representative of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for visits to 
Chechnya and the Russian Federation in 1995 and 1996.154 He has also been the 
Italian delegate to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its 
Legal Subcommittee.155 He is a Professor Emeritus of international law at the 
University of Milan, where he has also served as Dean of the Faculty of Political 
Sciences and Vice-Rector.156 He is the author of numerous publications on 
international human rights and humanitarian law, public and private international 
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law, and European law.157 He has lectured at the Hague Academy of International 
Law and is a member and treasurer of the Institut de Droit International and 
President of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (Sanremo).158 
András Sajó (Hungary) has been a judge of the European Court of Human 
Rights since February 1, 2008 and ECtHR Vice-President since November 1, 
2015.159 He obtained a law degree at the ELTE Law School of Budapest in 
1972.160 He has held various research fellow positions at the Institute for State 
and Law at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences since 1972.161 In 1977 and 1982, 
he obtained a Ph.D. and Habilitation at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
respectively.162 He was the founder and spokesperson of the Hungarian League 
for the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Budapest from 1988 to 1994 and Legal 
Counselor to the President of Hungary from 1991 to 1992.163 Judge Sajó was the 
Chair of Comparative Constitutional Law and a University Professor at the 
Central European University in Budapest from 1993 to 2007.164  
 Judge Sajó has been a member of the American Law Institute since 1996 and a 
member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences since 1997.165 Since 1990, he has 
been a recurrent visiting professor at the Cardozo School of Law in New York 
and since 1996, at the Global Faculty of New York University Law School.166 He 
was a member of the Board of Directors of the Open Society Justice Initiative of 
New York from 2001 to 2007.167 His recent publications include Constitutional 
Sentiments (Yale University Press, 2011) and Comparative Constitutionalism 
(with Dorsen et al.) (West Academic Publishing, 3rd edition, 2016).168 
Emmanuel Ugirashebuja (Rwanda) was appointed judge of the East 
African Court of Justice Appellate Division in November 2013.169 He was 
subsequently appointed President of the EACJ in June 2014.170 He holds a Ph.D. 
in law, University of Edinburgh; LL.M., University of Edinburgh; and LL.B., 
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National University Rwanda.171 He is also the recipient of a Draper Hills Summer 
Fellowship at Stanford University.172 Judge Ugirashebuja was previously Dean of 
the Law School, University of Rwanda (2009 to 2014); member of the Superior 
Council of Judiciary (2009 to 2014); member of the Supreme Council of 
Prosecution (2009 to 2014); senior lecturer at the National University of Rwanda; 
part of the team of experts in the East African Community on Fears, Challenges 
and Concerns towards the East African Political Federation (2010 to 2011); 
Legal Advisor at the Rwanda Environment Authority (2009); and legal advisor at 
the Rwandan Constitution Commission (2001 to 2003).173 He has lectured at the 
University of Edinburgh, University of Dar es Salaam, Rwanda Senior Command 
and Staff and Rwanda National Police College.174 He is an expert and arbitrator 
in both national and international arbitrations.175 
Christine Van den Wyngaert (Belgium) was elected Judge of the 
International Criminal Court as of March 11, 2009 for a term of nine years. 176 
Assigned to the Trial Division, she assumed full-time duty on September 1, 
2009.177 Prior to joining the ICC, Judge Van den Wyngaert served as a Judge in 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (2003 to 2009) and 
as Judge ad hoc in the Arrest Warrant Case (Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v. Belgium) at the International Court of Justice (2000 to 2002).178 In 2017, she 
was appointed judge of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, a position she will 
assume when her term ends at the ICC. Judge Van den Wyngaert served as an 
expert for the International Law Association, the European Union, and the 
International Association of Penal Law (in 2014 elected Vice-President).179 In 
addition, she was a member of the Criminal Procedure Reform Commission in 
Belgium (Commission Franchimont) (1991 to 1998).180 Judge Van den Wyngaert 
has been a professor of law at the University of Antwerp (1985 to 2005), visiting 
fellow at the University of Cambridge (1994 to 1997), and visiting professor at 
the Law Faculty of the University of Stellenbosch.181 Human rights have been a 
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focal area of her teachings and writings throughout her career.182 In 2006, she 
was awarded the Prize of the Human Rights League.183 In 2013, the Flemish 
Government awarded Judge Van den Wyngaert a golden medal for her 
achievements in international criminal law.184 She was granted the title of 
Baroness by the King of Belgium for her merits as an academic and as an 
international judge.185 This was followed in 2017 by an award of the Grand 
Medal of Honour of the Flemish Government. She graduated from Brussels 
University in 1974 and obtained a Ph.D. in International Criminal Law in 
1979.186 She has been awarded four doctorates honoris causa (Uppsala University, 
Sweden; University of Brussels, Belgium; University of Cleveland, Ohio, USA; 




David Thór Björgvinsson (Iceland) is a professor of law at the Faculty of 
Law, University of Copenhagen.188 Professor Björgvinsson served as judge of the 
European Court of Human Rights in respect of Iceland from 2004 to 2013.189 
Before he became a professor of law at Reykjavik University School of Law and 
the University of Iceland Faculty of Law, he held numerous other positions for 
public and private entities.190 Professor Björgvinsson has written books and 
published numerous articles on his studies, given courses, and lectured in his 
field in many countries.191 His main fields of research are general legal theory, 
European Union (EEA) law, and human rights.192 He studied history, philosophy, 
and law at the University of Iceland and legal philosophy at Duke University 
School of Law in the United States of America.193 He is a doctor of international 
law from Strasbourg University.194 He has done research in his field at the 
University of Edinburgh in Scotland; Rand Afrikaans University in Johannesburg 
in South Africa; the University of Copenhagen; Max Planck Institute in 
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Heidelberg, Germany; and Oxford University in England.195 
Richard J. Goldstone (South Africa) was a judge in South Africa for 23 
years—the last nine of which he served as a Justice of the Constitutional Court.196 
Since retiring from the bench, he has taught as a visiting professor in several 
American law schools.197 From August 1994 to September 1996 he was the Chief 
Prosecutor of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.198 He is an honorary bencher of the Inner Temple, 
London and an honorary fellow of St. John’s College, Cambridge.199 He is an 
honorary member of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and a 
foreign member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.200 He is an 
honorary life member of the International Bar Association and honorary 
President of its Human Rights Institute.201 He chaired the Advisory Board of 
Brandeis University’s International Center for Ethics, Justice and Public Life 




Leigh Swigart (USA) is Director of Programs in International Justice and 
Society at the International Center for Ethics, Justice, and Public Life at 
Brandeis University.203 She oversees the Brandeis Institute for International 
Judges, which is the only regular event convening members of the international 
judiciary across a wide spectrum of geographic and subject matter 
jurisdictions.204 She also organizes the Brandeis Judicial Colloquia series, which 
brings together international and national judges for dialogue about the growing 
intersections between their spheres of work.205 Swigart is the coauthor, with 
Center Director Daniel Terris and Cesare Romano, of The International Judge: 
An Introduction to the Men and Women Who Decide the World’s Cases 
(Brandeis University Press and Oxford University Press, 2007).206 Her academic 
work and publications have focused on the challenges of language diversity in 
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international criminal courts and tribunals; language use in post-colonial Africa; 
and African immigration and refugee resettlement in the United States.207 Her 
current research focuses on how the International Criminal Court manages the 
challenges associated with accommodating African language speakers in its 
investigations, in the courtroom, and in its outreach programming to affected 
regions and victims.208 Swigart has a Ph.D. in sociocultural anthropology from 
the University of Washington and is a two-time Fulbright scholar.209 
Daniel Terris (USA) is the Director of the International Center for Ethics, 
Justice, and Public Life at Brandeis University. An intellectual historian, he has 
written on race and ethnicity in the United States, business ethics, and 
international law and justice.210 His books include: Ethics at Work: Creating 
Virtue in an American Corporation and The International Judge: An 
Introduction to the Men and Women Who Decide the World’s Cases (with 
Leigh Swigart and Cesare P.R. Romano).211 As an academic entrepreneur and 
leader, Dr. Terris has overseen the development of many signature programs of 
Brandeis University, including the Brandeis Institute for International Judges, 
Brandeis-Genesis Institute for Russian Jewry, Master’s Program in Coexistence 
and Conflict, and University’s Division of Graduate Professional Studies.212 Dr. 
Terris has also served as the University’s Vice-President for Global Affairs, 
and built new connections for Brandeis in Israel, India, The Netherlands, and 
other countries.213 Daniel Terris received his Ph.D. in the history of American 




Chantal Sochaczevski (USA/Canada) is from Montreal.215 She graduated 
from Brandeis University in 2017 with a double major in Business and 
Psychology and a double minor in Legal Studies and Global Studies.216 During 
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Brandeis in The Hague program.217 During her junior year, she studied abroad in 
Sydney, Australia and had the opportunity to intern for the International 
Commission of Jurists Australia. 
 
Lee Wilson (USA) recently completed his junior year at Brandeis University, 
where he is majoring in International and Global Studies and Economics and is 
minoring in French and Francophone Studies and History. He attended the 
Brandeis in The Hague program during the summer of 2015, where he studied 
international criminal justice and legal implications of certain international 
institutions and initiatives.218 During his time in The Hague, Lee had the 
opportunity to participate in a moot court, where he pleaded before Judge Ivana 
Hrdličková of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 219 His previous experience with 
law also includes an internship with Christos Diktas, Esq., who specializes in 
municipal law. Lee intends on pursuing a degree in law to be used as a tool for 
justice and for the prevention of future conflicts. 
 
iCourts/Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen 
 
Federico Fabbrini (Italy) is a tenured Associate Professor of European & 
International Law.220 He holds a B.A. in European & Transnational Legal Studies 
from the University of Trento (2006), a J.D. in International Law from the 
University of Bologna (2008), and a Ph.D. in Law from the European University 
Institute (2012).221 He clerked for Justice Sabino Cassese at the Italian 
Constitutional Court (2010 to 2011) and qualified for the bar exam in Italy 
(2011).222 Before joining iCourts, he was Assistant Professor of European & 
Comparative Constitutional Law at Tilburg Law School in the Netherlands, 
where he was awarded tenure.223 Professor Fabbrini’s main areas of research are 
European, comparative and international law, with a focus on federalism, 
fundamental rights, separation of powers, economic governance, and national 
security, mainly in a comparative perspective between the European Union and 
the United States.224 On these topics he has published in, among others, the 
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Oxford Yearbook of European Law, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal 
Studies, European Constitutional Law Review, Common Market Law Review, 
European Law Review, Columbia Journal of European Law, Georgetown 
Journal of International Law, Berkeley Journal of International Law, Human 
Rights Law Review, and Harvard Human Rights Journal.225 Professor Fabbrini 
has published two monographs with Oxford University Press: Fundamental 
Rights in Europe: Challenges and Transformations in Comparative Perspective 
(2014, the published version of his Ph.D. thesis at the EUI) and Economic 
Governance in Europe: Comparative Paradoxes and Constitutional Challenges 
(2016).226 Moreover, he has co-edited four other volumes with Hart Publishing 
and Elgar Publishing, and edited two special journal issues. 
 
Henrik Stampe Lund (Denmark) is center administrator and daily manager 
at iCourts, Centre of Excellence for International Courts, at the Faculty of Law, 
University of Copenhagen. He is responsible for budgeting, allocating resources, 
and strategic planning related to research activities at iCourts. Over the last 
decade, he has in four different positions (in the humanities, the veterinary field, 
and law) worked with larger EU applications and EU consultancy, and is 
especially experienced in writing strategic parts of research applications. He has 
followed the development of research policy closely and published academic 
articles about European research policy. He has also worked as a lobbyist in 
Brussels on behalf of the Technical University of Denmark and as a veterinary 
medical industrial partner. Lund holds a Master of Arts and Ph.D. in literature 
and has nine years of research experience within the field of literary studies. His 
academic publications reflect a broad and interdisciplinary interest in topics such 
as European literature and history, democracy and governance, political theory, 
and philosophy of law. In addition, he has published books on the practice and 
theory of judgment and democracy. He has taught in the university sector for 
more than 20 years. 
 
Mikael Rask Madsen (Denmark) is professor of European Law and 
Integration and Director of iCourts, Centre of Excellence for International 
Courts, at the Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen.227 Trained as both a 
sociologist and a jurist, Madsen’s research is focused on international courts and 
the globalization of legal practices and practitioners.228 Madsen is the author of 
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more than one hundred articles and book chapters, as well as La Genèse de 
l’Europe des droits de l’homme: Enjeux juridiques et stratégies d’Etat (Presses 
Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2010) and co-editor of The European Court of 
Human Rights between Law and Politics (Oxford University Press, 2011/13); 
Making Human Rights Intelligible: Towards a Sociology of Human Rights (Hart 
Publishing, 2013); Transnational Power Elites: The New Professionals of 
Governance, Law and Security (Routledge, 2013); and Law and the Formation of 
Modern Europe: Perspectives from the Historical Sociology of Law.229 
 
Urška Šadl (Slovenia) is an Associate Professor at iCourts Centre of 
Excellence for International Courts at the Faculty of Law, University of 
Copenhagen.230 She holds an LL.M. in Legal Studies from the College of Europe 
in Bruges and a Ph.D. from the University of Copenhagen.231 Urška completed 
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